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In Portugal, as worldwide, especially in the past decades, crime has become an issue of 
increasing interest both for society and researchers. The global growth of criminality 
had  several  repercussions  in  the  prison  system.  The  most  direct  one  was  the 
overcrowding  of  prisons.  This  situation  required  a  great  amount  of  investment  to 
increase  the  capacity  of  Portuguese  prisons.  Simultaneously,  the  value  for  money 
associated with the prisons’ budget has turned itself more and more relevant. These 
circumstances together emphasize the importance of assessing the prisons’ performance. 
This study measures the efficiency of Portuguese prison facilities by means of the non-
parametric benchmarking approach of data envelopment analysis (DEA). However, due 
to the limitations of this technique, a bootstrap methodology is also applied in order to 
add more robustness to the results. Furthermore, a recent procedure is computed to 
evaluate congestion. The results show relevant levels of inefficiency in the Portuguese 
prison  facilities,  which  represent  an  excess  of  several  millions  of  Euros  spent 
inadequately in this sector.  
 













European countries, mainly since the mid 1990’s, have faced a “threatening” growth of 
criminality,  which  have  lead  to  a  significant  expansion  of  the  prison  population. 
According to Balassone et al. (2008) and based on Walmsley (1999 and 2007), the 
value estimated for prison inmates rise in Europe was about 17% for the period between 
1997 and 2006.  
 
In global terms, the Portuguese situation corroborates the European picture. Although 
not so markedly (between 1998 and 2003 criminality rose of 10% and after 2003 there 
was a slight decrease, as shown in figure 1 (INE, 2008). However, this only happened as 
a result of changes in the criminal law. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Crime rate recorded by police authorities in Portugal 
 
Many  are  the  reasons  pointed  out  by  governors  and  researchers,  among  other 
stakeholders, to explain the global growth in criminality (Saridakis, 2004). In this sense, 
criminologists  draw  a  distinction  between  ‘deterministic’  and  ‘policy-driven’ 
explanations  (Balassone  et  al.,  2008).  The  former  focus  on  issues  related  to  the 
variations  in  the  crime  rate,  demographic  changes  and  social  and  economic 
determinants,  including  child  poverty,  family  breakdown,  poor  education  and 
unemployment.  The  “policy-driven”  explanations  consider  the  increase  of  prison 
inmates as a combination of changes in public attitudes towards imprisonment and more 
rigorous  legislation,  resulting  in  longer  and  severe  sentences,  although  there  is  no 
evidence that these instruments are more effective in reducing crime. 
 
Like in other European countries, in order to deal with the growth of prison population 
(Walmsley, 2001), the Portuguese Government decided to build more prisons, boosting 
the capacity but, even so, not avoiding the inmates overcrowding in some particular 
cases (DGSP, 2009). Beyond the huge investments that were inherently associated, the 
simultaneous increase of the operational costs nowadays represents an important share 
in the State budget (Pratt and Maahs, 1999). 
 
All these circumstances, coming up together, transformed this sector into a significant 
issue for the Portuguese Government, pointing out the importance and the usefulness of 
measuring  the  performance  of  the  Portuguese  prison  facilities  (Gaes  et  al.,  2004). 
Besides identifying the benchmarks in the sector, this kind of analysis can instigate 3 
(fundamentally) the (inefficient) prisons to become more efficient, which is of great 
relevance concerning all the (monetary) resources involved in this sector (Avio, 1998). 
One of the most successful methodologies of performance evaluation consists in the 
application of the non-parametric benchmarking technique of data envelopment analysis 
(DEA). This methodology, being a mathematical programming technique, develops an 
(efficient) frontier to which each prison is compared, obtaining from that comparison its 
relative efficiency. It has the advantage of letting data “speak by itself” because unlike 
parametric  techniques,  such  as  stochastic  frontier  analysis,  it  does  not  rely  on  any 
specific functional form. Moreover, DEA deals easily with multiple inputs and outputs, 
points out the targets for each variable and allows for the identification of a group of 
efficient  organizations  (prisons  in  this  case)  to  each  inefficient  organization  with  a 
similar combination of inputs and outputs. 
 
The  main  contributions  of  this  paper  are  threefold.  The  first  one  is  related  to  the 
performance evaluation of prison facilities itself since so few examples appear in the 
literature. The second contribution concerns the application of recent non-parametric 
techniques regarding the efficiency measurement and the evaluation of the congestion 
phenomenon, respectively the bootstrap and Tone and Sahoo approaches. And, finally, 
this study might be useful for the Portuguese prison sector to improve its performance 
as  well  as  for  other  countries  worldwide.  After  this  brief  introduction,  the  paper 
reviewed the major studies on performance evaluation of prisons found in the literature. 
Next, the prison system in Portugal is characterized followed by the description of the 
methodologies  adopted  and  the  presentation  of  the  results  of  their  application. 




2. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The  literature  on  performance  evaluation  is  not  very  abundant. Without  taking  into 
account  partial  productivity  methods,  like  performance  indicators,  the  number  of 
performance studies is scarce. We only found seven studies, five in academic journals, 
one as a book chapter and the other as a working paper.  
 
In terms of the techniques adopted, the study of prison’s performance diverges evenly 
between the utilisation of parametric and non-parametric approaches. Until now, three 
studies  (Trumbull  and  Witte,  1981,  Panci,  1999,  Gyimah-Brembong,  2000  and 
Balassone et al., 2008) were developed applying parametric methods. Trumbull and 
Witte (1981) estimated a cost function for a sample of 6 federal correctional institutions 
in the US between 1976 and 1978. Panci (1999) estimated both a production and a cost 
function for a sample of 107 Italian prisons in 1996. Both studies followed a simple 
regression  approach  (Feldstein,  1967)  and  do  not  report  estimates  of  an  efficiency 
frontier.  In  addition,  Panci  (1999)  presented  some  indicators  for  individual  prisons 
comparing them with an efficient frontier. 
 
Gyimah-Brembong  (2000),  adopting  a  cost  function  approach,  evaluated  the 
performance  of  prisons  in  Florida  for  the  year  1997/98.  In  addition,  the  author 
encompasses  in  this  analysis  the  treatment  of  the  operational  environment  through 4 
variables as the health care personnel per inmate, the age of the prison and the ratio of 
black inmates. Like in other studies, relevant signs of inefficiency were found. 
 
More recently, Balassone et al. (2008) analyzed an unbalanced panel of 142 Italian 
penitentiaries for the time period 2003-2005. Using a stochastic cost frontier analysis, 
they  determined  significant  technical  inefficiency  levels,  mainly  attributable  to 
overstaffing. The chief source of inefficiency is identified in unexploited economies of 
scale. Both average prison size and technical efficiency are smaller in the South of Italy 
than in the rest of the country. All studies found out significant economies of scale in 
their samples. 
 
Regarding the non-parametric approaches, only Ganley and Cubbin (1992), Butler and 
Johnson (1997) and Nyhan (2002), in some way, evaluated the performance of prison 
facilities. All of them applied the DEA model. Ganley and Cubbin (1992) estimated the 
technical efficiency of 33 UK local prisons and remand centres for the financial year 
1984/85. They determined an average technical inefficiency equal to 0.88 (assuming 
variable returns to scale). The chief cause of inefficiency was associated with the excess 
of staff. 
 
Butler and Johnson (1997) developed their study not only to demonstrate the usefulness 
of DEA in evaluating the performance of justice administration, but also to measure the 
efficiency of 22 Michigan Prisons with 1992 data. That application was used to see 
which prisons were inefficient, providing some insights into the service supplied and 
identifying targets for performance levels. 
 
The studies of Ganley and Cubbin (1992) and Butler and Johnson (1997) use similar 
output considerations, diverging by the number of prisoner days in a year in Ganley and 
Cubbin (1992) and the yearly number of prisoners confined per facility in Butler and 
Johnson (1997). The major differences between them regard the inputs, whereas Ganley 
and Cubbin (1992) only used expenditure data as proxies for inputs, separating labour 
expenses from other costs, Butler and Johnson (1997) employed direct measures of the 
quantity  of  inputs  (number  of  staff  and  number  of  beds)  together  with  the  total 
expenditure.  
 
Finally, Nyhan  (2002) used DEA to evaluate de  performance  of 35 juvenile justice 
facilities in the state of Florida in US. In addition to the determination of the efficient 
facilities and the estimation of targets for the inefficient ones, the authors promoted a 
comparison  between  the  state-operated  and  privately  contracted  facilities.  Privately 




3. PORTUGUESE PRISON SYSTEM  
 
3.1   Institutional framework 
 
The Portuguese prison facilities are under the supervision of the Directorate General of 
Prison  Services  (DGSP),  which  constitutes  an  auxiliary  body  of  the  judiciary 5 
administration  (part  of  the  Ministry  of  Justice).  Although  DGSP  has  administrative 
autonomy, it stays under the State's direct administration, following the organic law of 
DGSP stated in Law no. 125 of 2007. 
 
The DGSP has the task of managing the prison system (guiding services of arrestment 
and  execution  of  punishments;  supervise  the  prison’s  organization  and  operation), 
ensuring life conditions compatible with human dignity and contributing to the public 
order  and  social  peace  through  the  maintenance  of  community  safety  and  creating 
conditions  for  social  reintegration  of  inmates,  allowing  them  to  lead  their  life  in  a 
socially  responsible  way.  Moreover,  DGSP  has  also  the  attribution  of  conducting 
studies and investigations regarding the treatment of offenders. 
 
Under  the  management  of  the  DGSP,  the  Portuguese  prisons  are  distinguished 
according to three different classifications, such as security level, internal organisation 
and  availability  of  services  and  facilities  (Eiras,  2007).  These  classifications  are 
presented in table 1. 
 
Table 1 – Classification of the Portuguese prisons 
Internal Organisation  Security*  Services and facilities 
Central  Maximum  Medical services 
Special  Closed  Vocational training 
Regional  Open  Labour occupation 
  Mixed  Education 
    Sport and socio-cultural activities 
* The classification of establishments’ security is the responsibility of the Minister of Justice, upon 
proposal of the Director-General; 
 
The  prison  facilities  are  designed  to  take  prisoners  into  custody  and  execute  the 
punishments complying with all security measures. In Portugal, there were 50 prisons in 
2008, divided in 17 Central prisons, 4 Special prisons and 29 Regional prisons. Their 
classification  depends  on  the  length  of  the  inmates’  sentence.  The  Central  prison’s 
responsibilities comply with custodial measures longer than 6 months; while the Special 
prison’s  attribution  relies  on  internment  of  inmates in  need  of  special care, that  is, 
young adults up to 25 years, women and sick inmates, the latter integrated in prison 
hospitals. Finally, the Regional prisons deal with preventive or inmates sentenced to 
terms not exceeding 6 months. Note that Regional prisons are financially dependent on 
the central services. 
 
Figure 2 presents the geographical distribution of prisons facilities in the Portuguese 
territory (DGSP, 2009).  
 
Given the geographical distribution of the judicial districts (according to the division of 
the courts in XIX century) and the prison facilities location (also largely a reflection of 
the past), each district court has the following distribution of prison facilities: i) Oporto: 




3.2 Prison service in numbers 
 
In  2008,  the  prison  facilities  available  had  the  capacity  to  deal  with  12,294  prison 
inmates. This means that, unlike before 2006, in global terms, the inmates overcrowding 
was no longer observed, as it is demonstrated in figure 3 (based on INE, 2008). The 
population in Portugal in that year was about 10.7 million. The decrease of inmate 
population since 2005 cannot be explained by a reduction of criminality but due to a 
reform in penal law, e.g. with the implementation of domiciliary detentions.  
 
Figure 2 – Geographic distribution of Portuguese prison facilities 
 
 






Unisex Prison 7 
Regarding the female inmate population, there was a slight reduction in quantity terms. 
Indeed, the volume of women inmates, which was stable at 7% since 2003, in 2008, 
decreased to 6%. 
 
As far as foreigners are concerned, nowadays they represent 20.3% of the inmate’s 
population  (DGSP,  2009).  Notice  that  foreign  inmates  have  grown  gradually.  In 
particular,  since  2001  until  the  end  of  2008,  they  increased  8.4%.  Regarding  their 
origins by continent, Africa with 57.6%, particularly the Portuguese-speaking African 
countries,  is  in  the  first  place,  followed  by  Europe  (23.7%),  particularly  those  of 
Spanish, Romanian and Ukrainian origins. Finally, South America (17.4%) comes third, 
where the natives of Brazil and Venezuela surpass all other nationalities. 
 
In global terms, the prison population has low educational levels. This is expressed by 
the fact that more than 10% of the inmates have no schooling at all and 60% of the 
remainder inmates only have the lower levels of basic education (DGSP, 2009). 
 
Questions related to deaths and security in Portuguese prisons have been a matter of 
struggle by the Authorities in charge. As a result, there was a reduction in the number of 
deaths and escape attempts by inmates. The number of deaths (68 for 2008) decreased 
year after year since 2003 and remained always below one hundred. It is worth taking 
into account the health conditions that the majority of inmates show where they enter 
the prison facility, the morbidity of the diseases involved and the volume of people who 
are reported (considering the prison population incoming and outgoing each year). This 
circumstance reflects a great effort that the prison services have made in improving 
medical care and assistance to the prison population. 
 
3.3 Performance assessment and accountability 
 
In 2008, the Portuguese Government reformed the Public Administration and, among 
other aspects, compelled public services to (self) evaluate their performance. This plan, 
the  Assessment  Framework  and  Accountability  (QUAR),  has  the  goal  of  not  only 
identifying the best practices in the sector and instigating the prison service to become 
more efficient, but also of creating a tool capable of inducing responsibility in their 
managers. In this regard, DGSP defined five main objectives for the Justice area in 
Portugal, namely: 
 
1. Optimizing the main mission of DGSP; 
2. Improving the functioning of the prison and simplifying the procedures; 
3. Upgrading and enhancing the human resources; 
4. Modernizing the material and technological resources; 
5. Reforming the prison park. 
 
In  this  sense,  the  Portuguese  prisons,  to  achieve  the  strategic  objectives  mentioned 
above, have drawn 6 operational objectives, diverging, however, in the number of the 
performance indicators (encompassing the different domains of effectiveness, efficiency 
and quality). Those performance indicators are presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2 – Objectives and performance indicators adopted for Portuguese prisons 




Obj1.  Increase by 10% the number of inspections and searches in prison 
facilities 
102  123  121% 
Obj2. Increasing occupancy rates and labour integration of inmates by 
2.5%, in order to improve their social reintegration 
355  366  101% 
Obj3.  Increase  by  5%  the  rate  of  implementation  of  the  Individual 
Rehabilitation Plan (PIR) to inmates condemned 
25  42  126.9% 
Obj4. Increase the occupancy rate in school activities / training of 
prison population by 2.5%, to enhance their personal and social 
skills 
47  76  162% 
Obj5. Reduction in 10% of the average time for completion of prisoners 
investigation 
37  30  119% 







The deterministic methodology of DEA is a non-parametric benchmarking technique 
that uses linear mathematical programming to construct an efficient frontier in order to 
assess the relative performance of organizational units (prison establishments in this 
case). As a non-parametric approach, instead of assuming a function to the production 
or  cost  frontier  (as  in  parametric  methods),  the  frontier  is  constituted  by  the  best 
practices observed in the data set. Therefore, it does not need a prior specification for 
the  weights  of  each  input  and  output,  neither  does  it  require  judgments  on  the 
production or cost function form. In the presence of an industry with multiple inputs and 
outputs,  the  technical  efficiency  of  each  operator  is  assessed  by  the  distance  that 
separates  each  one  from  the  frontier,  that  is,  by  the  potential  savings  obtained  by 
reducing the inputs for the same level of outputs (input orientation) or, vice-versa, by 
the maximization of outputs for the same level of inputs consumed (output orientation).  
 
The primary model, developed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes in 1978 (Charnes et al., 
1978), is commonly known as CCR or CRS model, since it assumes constant returns to 
scale for the production (cost) technology. It can be formulated as a liner program, to 
which the relative efficiency of the organizations is obtained. For an input orientation, 
we have: 
 
                                         m θ min                                                                                    (1) 
 
subject to: 







km m y y λ                l i ,..., 2 , 1 =  







m im m x x λ θ              t k ,..., 2 , 1 =  
                 0 ≥ m λ                                    n m ,..., 2 , 1 =  
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Where, m is the index representative of each prison facility, θ is the value obtained for 
the technical efficiency, x and y correspond to (l) inputs and (t) outputs, respectively, 
and λ their associated weights. 
 
Few years later, in the 80s, Banker et al. (1984) introduced the possibility of variable 
returns to  scale (VRS), named BCC  or VRS  model, by  adding  to algorithm (1)  an 
additional constraint  1 = ∑λ . Gathering DEA-CCR and DEA-BCC models allows for 
the computation of scale economies which measure the influence of size on efficiency. 
Like this, the technical efficiency (TE, obtained from CCR model) can be decomposed 




DEA is not a panacea for benchmarking, since both technical and practical limitations 
exist  (Nyhan,  2002).  Besides  being  extremely  sensitive  to  outliers,  DEA  does  not 
determine the relative differences among efficient prisons (Simar and Wilson, 1998). 
So, in order to mitigate some of those limitations and to confer robustness to the results, 
a DEA-bootstrap methodology, as proposed by Simar and Wilson (vide Fried et al., 
2008), was applied.  
 
In basic terms, the bootstrap consists in the replication of B times the traditional DEA 
with random data obtained from the real data. One will be determining, each time, a 
particular imaginary frontier that corresponds to a specific set of peers (which works as 
a benchmark for each prison), representing a particular level of non-observable or non-
included variables.  
 
4.3 Evaluation of the congestion phenomenon 
 
The  congestion  phenomenon  has  been  studied  over  time  through  the  application  of 
diverse techniques, namely Fare et al. (1985), Cooper et al. (1996) and Tone and Sahoo 
(2004)  approaches  (for  more  details  about  the  different  congestion  approaches  see 
Simões and Marques, 2009). Although there is divergence of perceptions between them 
about the best way to compute congestion, its definition remains untouchable, that is, 
“after a given value the increase in inputs can lead to a decrease in outputs or, vice-
versa, a decrease in outputs can lead to an increase in inputs”. We opted to apply in this 
research the most recent one, that is, Tone and Sahoo approach which a priori, has more 
advantages.  
 
Tone  and  Sahoo  approach,  a  new  two-stage  method,  measures  the  phenomenon 
congestion using the slacks-based measure (SBM) in the second stage (Tone, 2001). 
The SBM formulation (in an output orientation) is given by: 
 






















k c  and 
−
i c  correspond to the existence or not of congestion, respectively, and ε is 
an Archimedean value.  10 
Tone  and  Sahoo  approach  distinguishes  between  strong  and  weak  congestion.  In  a 
practical view, the former corresponds to the congestion of all inputs whereas the latter 
occurs  when  not  all  the  inputs  are  congested.  Other  advantage  of  Tone  and  Sahoo 
approach is to establish a relationship between scale economies and congestion. The 
scale diseconomy (ρ) can be determined by the ratio between the change in y by the 
change in x. Therefore, it measures the potential increase in output from eliminating the 
congestion of inputs. However, this is true only for the case of existence of strong 
congestion (ρ < 0).   
 
 
5. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
 
5.1 Model specification and data 
 
Considering  the  provision  of  prison  services,  since  the  unique  objective  is  the 
minimization  of  the  resources  consumed  (and  obviously  not  the  instigation  of  the 
criminality  and  consequently  the  number  of  prison  inmates)  for  a  quality  pattern 
established (Aubyn, 2008), it induces the clear-cut idea of adopting an input orientation 
for the model. This research was carried out with a set of data from 47 Portuguese 
prison facilities relative to the year 2007. The data was obtained from DGSP annual 
reports and questioning people with high knowledge of the sector.  
 
In line with the literature (Ganley and Cubbin, 1992, Butler and Johnson, 1997), the 
model  specification  encompass  two  outputs,  respectively  the  number  of  inmates  in 
Portuguese  prisons  and  the  number  of  inmates  that  had  participated  in  training 
programmes (institutional programmes and/or labour occupation) and two inputs, that 
is, the number of staff (from administration functions to the prison guards) and the 
operational  expenses  of  the  prison  establishment  (being  subtracted  the  costs 
corresponding to the prison staff). The basic statistics for each variable are given in 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3 - Model statistics 
  Mean  Str. Dev.  Median  Min.  Max. 
INPUTS           
Operational Expenses (€)  737,968  713,015  354,651  185,759  3,306,000 
Staff (no.)  114  83  69  33  337 
OUTPUTS           
Inmates (no.)  258  253  137  32  988 
Inmates in training 
programmes (no.)  161  153  103  11  687 
 
5.2 DEA results 
 
As referred to before, two models, CCR and BCC, were computed in order to evaluate 
the performance of the Portuguese prisons. Notice that the performance results obtained 
from CCR model correspond to the TE and the PTE is determined by the BCC model. 
The SE is determined by the ratio between TE and PTE. Table 4 displays the summary 
of the main results obtained for the Portuguese prison facilities. 
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Table 4 - Results for the Portuguese prison facilities 
Type    Prison  CRS  VRS  SE 
Central  1  Alcoentre  0.856  0.860  0.995 
  2  Carregueira  0.790  0.793  0.997 
  3  Caxias  0.141  0.306  0.461 
  4  Coimbra  0.567  0.573  0.990 
  5  Funchal  0.605  0.611  0.991 
  6  Izeda  0.611  0.621  0.985 
  7  Linhó  0.601  0.620  0.968 
  8  Lisboa  0.686  0.694  0.989 
  9  Monsanto  1.000  1.000  1.000 
  10  Paços de Ferreira  0.177  0.298  0.594 
  11  Pinheiro da Cruz  0.741  1.000  0.741 
  12  Porto  0.943  0.945  0.998 
  13  Santa Cruz do Bispo  0.881  1.000  0.881 
  14  Santarém  0.664  1.000  0.664 
  15  Sintra  0.167  0.569  0.293 
  16  Vale de Judeus  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Special  17  Leiria  0.864  0.870  0.994 
  18  Santa Cruz do Bispo  0.560  0.575  0.973 
  19  Tires  0.414  0.425  0.975 
Regional  20  Angra do Heroísmo  1.000  1.000  1.000 
  21  Aveiro  0.668  1.000  0.668 
  22  Beja  0.529  0.698  0.758 
  23  Braga  1.000  1.000  1.000 
  24  Bragança  0.491  0.829  0.592 
  25  Caldas da Rainha  0.673  0.923  0.729 
  26  Castelo Branco  0.458  0.622  0.737 
  27  Chaves  0.492  0.905  0.543 
  28  Coimbra  0.710  0.770  0.922 
  29  Covilhã  0.472  0.658  0.717 
  30  Elvas  0.486  0.864  0.563 
  31  Évora  0.390  0.731  0.534 
  32  Faro  0.446  0.577  0.773 
  33  Guarda  0.720  0.770  0.935 
  34  Guimarães  0.574  0.814  0.705 
  35  Lamego  0.494  0.817  0.605 
  36  Leiria  0.794  0.859  0.924 
  37  Montijo  0.451  0.532  0.849 
  38  Odemira  0.752  1.000  0.752 
  39  Ponta Delgada  0.967  1.000  0.967 
  40  Setúbal  0.638  0.657  0.972 
  41  Silves  0.669  0.880  0.761 
  42  Torres Novas  0.536  1.000  0.536 
  43  Viana do Castelo  0.464  0.798  0.582 
  44  Vila Real  0.600  0.796  0.754 
  45  Viseu  0.612  0.791  0.774 
  46  PJ Lisboa  0.753  0.913  0.825 
  47  PJ Porto  0.314  0.950  0.330 
    Average  0.626  0.785  0.794 
    Standard Deviation  0.229  0.199  0.194 
    Median  0.605  0.793  0.881 
    Minimum  0.141  0.298  0.293 
    Maximum  1.000  1.000  1.000 
 
The inefficiency levels of Portuguese prisons for the year 2007 were meaningful. The 
average TE value was 0.626. In Portugal, the prison facilities show average potential 12 
savings of TE of about 37%. This means that, on average, each prison could reduce the 
inputs  consumed  by  37%,  i.e.,  they  could  reduce  their  number  of  employees  and 
expenses in the percentage referred to by dealing with the same number of inmates and 
training programmes. It would correspond to a saving of about 12 million of euros in 
that year and an average reduction of about 1,650 employees. 
 




The DEA results have shown that the prisons of Monsanto, Vale de Judeus, Angra do 
Heroísmo and Braga are the most efficient ones, in opposition to the prisons of Caxias, 
Paços de Ferreira and Sintra which are remarked for being the most inefficient ones. 
 
Only considering the scale effect, if prisons could operate at an optimal scale, it would 
represent  a  reduction  of  input  consumption  of  about  20%.  From  the  47  prison 
establishments, 38 of them present increasing returns to scale, 5 decreasing returns to 
scale and 4 CRS. 
 
When the  DEA  results are  disaggregated  according  to  the  organisation  level  of  the 
Portuguese prisons, such as Central Prisons, Regional Prisons and Special Prisons, the 
Regional ones stand out as the most efficient and, as expected, the Special prisons as the 
less efficient ones. This can be observed in Figure 4.   
 
 
Figure 4 – CRS and VRS efficiencies for Central, Regional and Special prisons 
 13 
Different types of analysis can be drawn from these results. For instance, the better 
results of the Regional prisons can be explained through their less complex service, that 
is, the most dangerous inmates are sent to the central prisons, and, the most particular 
and troublesome cases, to the Special prisons. This, inevitably, could mean that the 
Central and, particularly, the Special prisons require more resources. However, if the 
scale effect is considered (by means of CRS model) there is some balance between the 
savings originated in a more optimal scale and the increasing of costs due to the great 




The  results  obtained  from  the  application  of  the  DEA-bootstrap-VRS  model  are 
displayed in Figure 5. A 95% confidence level interval and a B of 2000 were adopted. 
 
 
Figure 5 – DEA-bootstrap-VRS model results 
 
The  results  revealed  inefficiency  levels  higher  than  the  ones  obtained  by  the  DEA 
model. The prisons are, on average, about 29% per cent inefficient using the DEA-
bootstrap-VRS  model  (about  41%  in  DEA-CRS  model).  Nevertheless,  it  should  be 
noticed that the extreme values (best and worst practices) in the Portuguese prisons are 




The congestion results obtained from Tone and Sahoo approach are presented in Figure 
6, embracing both the values of congestion and scale diseconomies per prison facility. 
 
It shows signs of congestion for Portuguese prisons ranging between 3.2% (considering 
all the prisons) and 5.6% (only for the congested ones). As can be observed, 27 prisons 
revealed  congestion  inefficiencies,  such  as  the  prisons  of  Alcoentre,  Carregueira, 
Castelo Branco, Caxias, Coimbra, Funchal, Izeda, Linhó, Monsanto, Pinheiro da Cruz, 
Santarém, Vale de Judeus, Leiria, Santa Cruz do Bispo, Aveiro, Bragança, Caldas da 
Rainha, Coimbra, Covilhã, Faro, Guarda, Lamego, Leiria, Montijo, Setúbal, Vila Real 
and Viseu. 
 
In  addition,  as  abovementioned,  the  Tone  and  Sahoo  approach  also  enables  us  to 
evaluate  scale  diseconomies,  via  parameter  ρ.  In  practical  terms,  it  means  that  if  a 14 
decrease of 1% exists in congested inputs, the outputs production has, on average, a 
potential improvement of about 1.6% (in this case). 
 
 
Figure 6 – Congestion inefficiencies and scale diseconomies 
 
Corroborating the results obtained by DEA, we observe higher levels of congestion in 
Central and in Special prisons, which is directly related to the excess of resources in 
their  organisational  structure.  Figure  7  shows  the  congestion  inefficiency  level  per 
organization type of prisons.  
 
 
Figure 7 - Congestion inefficiency level per organization type of prisons 
 
These results were as expected, since it would be predictable that the major prisons with 
higher complexity and more managerial difficulties would have the most intense signs 
of congestion.   
 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The accomplishment of this study proves once again the importance that benchmarking, 
in general, and the application of these models, in particular, might have to help the 
managers  to  make  decisions.  Prison  officials  and  state  administrators  can  use  the 
information obtained by DEA to improve the allocation of resources among the prison 
facilities and their utilization, especially since we are dealing with public money. As 
prison facilities represent public entities extremely costly to the State, the promotion of 
efficiency and innovation principles in their administration is essential. 
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In recent years, the prison sector has gone through some reforms which have increased 
the interest and importance of this kind of studies in Portugal, trying to determine the 
best  way  of  providing  this  service.  This  research  evaluated  the  performance  of  47 
Portuguese prisons through the non-parametric frontier method of DEA, pointing out 
significant levels of inefficiency. 
 
For example, using CRS and VRS models we estimated an average level of 37% and 
21%  of  inefficiency  for  the  Portuguese  prisons,  respectively.  Besides,  if  prisons 
operated at an optimal size, they would be able to save about 20% of their costs (inputs 
consumed) for the same quantity of outputs produced. In addition, on average, prison 
facilities showed increasing returns to scale. 
 
In particular, if the scale effect is eliminated (applying the VRS model) as it would be 
expected a priori, Regional prisons revealed better performances when compared with 
the Special and Central prisons. This might be explained by the fact that these facilities 
deal with less troublesome cases, since the more complicated ones are transferred to the 
Central and Special prisons.  
 
Another  objective  of  this  paper  was  to  find  out  the  influence  of  the  congestion 
phenomenon in the prison efficiency. To fulfil it, we computed the recent TS approach. 
This approach highlighted signs of congestion of 3.2% and 5.6% when the whole set of 
Portuguese prison facilities is considered and when only the sample of the congested 
ones are taken into account, respectively.  
 
According to this approach, 27 Portuguese prisons show signs of congestion. Therefore, 
for these prisons, the results should constitute an alert regarding the expansion of their 
services. Although more research is required, especially in the presence of congestion 
signs, when technical inefficiency is computed, there are consequences that cannot be 
disregarded. 
 
The application of benchmarking in prisons may be used by the managers to establish 
budget  targets,  avoid  personal  excess,  provide  a  basis  for  contract  renewal  or 
termination,  and  assist  in  developing  strategies  for  improving  the  performance  of 
inefficient providers. Rankings as outcomes of benchmarking exercises may also be 
very useful for this purpose. Policy makers will need improved analytic tools to enhance 
decision making, where DEA and other new robust methods might have an important 
role addressing this need, providing managers with means to reveal the efficiency of 
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